A successful conclusion of the Doha round has become ever more improbable. Besides, the Upper House of Parliament has decided not to negotiate a more liberal free trade agreement with the USA.
This article looks at the structural reasons behind the altogether unsatisfactory results of the World Trade Organization conferences of ministers since the Uruguay round and the present problems with a new world trade round. World Trade Organization agreements are more strongly affected by topic-spreading interdependences, which bring in increasingly heterogeneous conceptions over worthwhile goals and suitable ways for the World Trade Organization.
India, Brazil and South Africa belong to the most intractable blocking actors in the Doha Round. In order to explain this posture, reference is frequently made to the lack of willingness to compromise on the part of the other central actors EU and USA. In addition, the three countries' interests in the construction of an alliance of the South are cited as motivation for blocking the negotiations. This paper, however, accepts that trade policy is a two-level game and shows that the configurations of national decision processes in India, Brazil and South Africa and the resulting influence of specific interest groups significantly contribute to consolidating the blockade position. Against this backdrop, the authors are sceptical about the prospects of a compromise solution to the Doha Round.
When the General Tariff and Trade Agreement was initiated in 1947, the goal of this system was the mutual opening of national markets. In the meantime, the created world trading order is in danger to split apart into regional markets. The World Trade Organization (WTO) currently counts 200 trade unions, free trade areas, preferential agreements and economic partnerships that went back to introducing their own tariffs, distanced themselves from the most favoured nation and national treatment clauses and created additional trade barriers such as certificates of origin. The first part of the paper contains a conceptional differentiation of regional free trade areas; the second part discusses the proliferation of regional agreements despite GATT and WTO. The necessary corrections are debate...
Regeste Art. 48 LwG; Art. 19 Abs. 1 lit. a SV; Verteilung des Zollkontingents für Nierstücke. Das System, welches die neue Schlachtviehverordnung für die Verteilung der Anteile am Zollkontingent für Schlachtvieh und Fleisch von "Tieren der Rindviehgattung" (insbesondere auch für Nierstücke) vorsieht, verstösst nicht gegen die Grundsätze von Art. 48 LwG. **************************************** Regeste Art. 48 LAgr; art. 19 al. 1 let. a OBB; répartition du contingent tarifaire pour les aloyaux. Ne viole pas les principes de l'art. 48 LAgr, le système prévu par la nouvelle ordonnance sur le bétail de boucherie pour l'attribution des parts du contingent tarifaire pour le bétail de boucherie et la viande des "animaux de l'espèce bovine" (en particulier aussi pour les aloyaux). **********...
Gesundheitsschutz im Recht der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO), by Tilman Makatsch, is reviewed.
... Tokio-Runde stammenden und in der UruguayRunde revidierten Abkommen uber technische Handelshemmni...
, by Amitra Narlikar, is reviewed.
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